
Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Hits 178 Major Websites
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Visitors to the world’s busiest websites spent most of Monday loading hostile code from a script their pages already trusted. The Optimizely supply chain attack, uncovered on 16 November 2026, reached visitors at 178 organisations. Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, HSBC, Equifax and IKEA were among them, and not one suffered an intrusion of its own. The injected code swapped cryptocurrency addresses, skimmed payment cards, stole cookies and screenshots, and pushed exploit kits at older iPhones.
How the Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Reached 178 Organisations
Optimizely Web Experimentation has customers load one snippet from cdn.optimizely.com across their site. That snippet carries an optional Project JavaScript field, which the customer controls and which runs on every page view. The attacker wrote a loader into that field and left everything else alone. Optimizely’s delivery network kept serving the file from a trusted domain with a valid certificate.
Scott Helme of Report URI caught the problem on Monday and swept the platform to size it up. He checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected files across 178 organisations. The real total is probably higher. Banking and finance carried the heaviest share at 32 organisations, with technology and SaaS close behind.
Three loader variants appeared across the infected files, which made the supply chain attack on Optimizely hard to block with any single rule. Some used a plain script tag, while others hid the same URL behind base64 encoding. A third ran a full inline copy through eval when the remote domain stayed silent. Files served to BBC and HSBC UAE visitors embedded a 24,392-byte theft payload directly in the project code.
What the Malicious Script Did to Visitors
Cryptocurrency Address Swapping
The first payload build worked as a clipper, and it gave the Optimizely supply chain attack its earliest returns. It hunted for wallet addresses across eight currencies, including Bitcoin, Ethereum, TRON and Solana. The swap reached page content, form fields, the clipboard, outgoing requests and even the iOS share sheet. Anyone copying an address from a legitimate page could paste the attacker’s address into a wallet.
Payment Card Skimming
A card skimmer joined the payload at 13:43 UTC, nine hours into the Optimizely supply chain attack. The code watched forms and POST requests for Luhn-valid card numbers with expiry dates and CVVs, then sent complete sets to the attacker’s server. Hosted payment iframes stayed out of reach, which spared sites that hand card entry to a processor.
iOS Exploit Delivery
Mobile visitors met two exploit kits, Coruna for iOS 13 through 17 and DarkSword for iOS 18.x. Devices on iOS 18.6 or earlier got pages that reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit chain. Comments inside the kits indicate that iOS 18.7.3 and 26.3 close the holes the kits target.
Seventeen Hours of Exposure
The pace deserves attention, because the Optimizely supply chain attack kept evolving while it ran. Scans show the BBC’s snippet still clean at 02:21 UTC, with the first injection arriving at 04:21. The attacker compiled the payload at 08:10 and had it running on bbc.com within twenty minutes.
Mid-afternoon brought upgrades rather than a static payload sitting in place. Stolen cryptocurrency moved to exchanges at 13:03, and a second iOS routing domain appeared at 16:38. Over the day the attack went through 26 payload rebuilds. A mass clean-up ran from roughly 20:40 to 21:10, leaving one infected snippet by 21:52.
Why the Optimizely Supply Chain Attack Beat Most Security Policies
The most uncomfortable finding concerns the defences that stood in place when the incident began. Of 256 sites crawled during the incident, just 24 blocked the payload. That is a success rate of 15 percent. Those 24 ran restrictive script-src Content Security Policy directives, while sites allowing ‘strict-dynamic’ or ‘unsafe-eval’ let the code through.
At HSBC, the policy blocked the remote script, but the inline fallback copy still ran. Sites with a tight connect-src directive stopped card, cookie and screenshot data from leaving the browser. Address swapping carried on regardless, because that manipulation happens locally and needs no outbound request.
Subresource integrity, the usual answer to a tampered third-party file, offered nothing here. Optimizely rewrites each customer’s snippet whenever an experiment changes, so the supply chain attack left no fixed hash to pin against. That same flexibility is what made the platform such an efficient delivery channel.
Optimizely Confirms a Signup Flaw
Optimizely confirmed the supply chain attack and pointed to its own account creation process as the entry point. A spokesperson said an unauthorized party had exploited a vulnerability in the Experimentation account signup flow. The party used that access to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. An official notice went up on the company status page at 01:02 UTC on 17 November.
Optimizely patched the vulnerable path, removed the injected code, ended active sessions, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts. It also blocked further code delivery at its Cloudflare layer and notified affected customers. None of that resets visitor sessions on the downstream websites, which leaves that job with each customer.
Salesforce disabled the unauthorized script changes as a precaution while it investigated. Equifax went further and dropped Optimizely altogether, after finding no evidence of compromise in its own systems. That distinction carries weight, because exposure through a third-party script is a separate event from a breach of a company’s own systems.
A Wider Campaign Against Web Service Providers
Evidence collected after the fact suggests the Optimizely supply chain attack formed one part of a larger operation. Researchers at Hudson Rock traced poisoned scripts across four services: Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly. A poisoned Kissmetrics response surfaced on 13 November, three days before Monday’s wave.
No security vendor has named a threat actor, and researchers have settled on the label OPTIMJACK for tracking. The TRON wallet collecting the stolen funds has been active since March 2026, which points to an operator with history. Roughly $7,040 had reached the attacker’s wallets by 19:25 UTC, most of it sitting in one unspent Bitcoin balance. Estimates vary, and one research team puts the figure nearer $6,600.
What Site Operators Should Do Now
Every third-party script on a page runs with the authority of first-party code. The Optimizely supply chain attack shows the cost when the vendor behind one of those scripts turns out to be the weak link. Teams running Experimentation should audit Project JavaScript for unknown domains and unexpected atob() calls, which decode hidden text and can mask an attacker’s domain. They should also rotate platform credentials and API tokens, and treat card data submitted on 16 November as exposed.
The defensive lesson reaches well past one vendor and one platform. A Content Security Policy that restricts script-src and connect-src and avoids ‘unsafe-eval’ would have blunted this campaign at most of the sites it touched. Visitors should update iOS to 18.7.3 or later and verify cryptocurrency addresses before sending funds.
One signup flaw at a mid-sized vendor bought seventeen hours of write access to the consumer internet’s front pages. The yield stayed modest because researchers found the campaign quickly, not because the method failed. The next operator to find a path like this may arrive with sharper monetisation and more patience.
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